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Introduction
Since the Revolution of 1910, the Mexican
agrarian structure has undergone radical change.
By 1970 over 60 million hectares of land (11
million of which are arable) had been distributed
to 2 million beneficiaries. These beneficiaries
(called ejidatarios) are given usufructural rights
to land as members of 21,475 ejidos (landholding
communities). Title to all ejido land is vested
with the federal government in perpetuity. Ejidos
can be farmed individually, semi-collectively or
collectively; the great majority of them are divided
into individual plots.
During the 1960s, many authors began to question
the success of the Agrarian Reform in eliminating
poverty and inequality. (Stavenhagen, 1968 and
1970), calling attention to the continued concen-
tration of land within the private sector (which
controlled 16 million hectares of arable land). At
present two thirds of all private farm units are less
than five hectares in size. At the other extreme,
34 per cent of farm units still control 98 per cent
of all agricultural land which is not in ejidos
(Stavenhagen, 1970:231). In addition to control
by ownership, private landowners were in-
creasingly renting ejido plots, particularly in areas
of highest agricultural potential, in the irrigated
zones of the North East and North West. They
noted a corresponding concentration of benefits
in a few hands from the green revolution (in 1960,
2 per cent of farms accounted for 70 per cent of
the value of sales, while 55 per cent of farms had
annual sales below £50). The ejido sector was
characterised principally by its reliance on sub-
sistence agriculture on micro plots under dry
farming conditions. (In 1960 44 per cent of ejido
plots were less than four hectares, and only about
20 per cent of the total were irrigated). These
authors claimed that since 1940 credit and organ-
isational assistance to the ejido sector had been
1 This paper sets out in a highly condensed form some of the
preliminary findings and analysis of a case study undertaken
in NW. Mexico in 1975 with the financial support of 0DM
Teaching Materials Project, I am grateful for the valuable
assistance given by Susana Glantz and Carlos Sarti ofCISINAH (Research Centre of the Institute of !uithro-pology and History), Manuel de Alba and Jose Antonio
Garcia, anthropology students of the Universidad Ibero-
americana, Mexico City during the period of fieldwork in
Mexico. My thanks are also due to the members of the
ejidos and credit societies and officials of BANOSA andCRF in the Carrizo Valley and Los Machis. A first draft
of the complete case study is at present used in the teaching
programmes in DAS (Winder D. 1976).
insufficient to enable it to compete effectively with
the private sector. They argued that if a social
and economic crisis were to be averted, (land
invasions were increasing and the rate of growth
in the agricultural sector declining),2 government
policy should give priority to a search for the
most effective means of channelling the green
revolution technology to the ejido sector.
Recalling the significant but ill-fated experiments
in cooperative farming introduced during the
government of President Cardenas (1934-40), col-
lective ejidos were once again advocated by some,
as one solution. In response to this current of
opinion, policies were introduced with the aim
of encouraging ejidatarios to form a range of
cooperative organisations. These are embodied in
the Agrarian Reform Law of 1971 which indi-
cated that ejidos organised collectively would
receive special attention from government
agencies. Article 152, for example, obliges firms
with government participation involved in the
production of agricultural inputs to channel them
directly to ejidos or associations of ejidos. Prior
to the introduction of these policies the govern-
ment of Diaz Ordaz had decided that the 19
ejidos in the Carrizo Valley Irrigation Scheme,
in N.W. Mexico, would work collectively. This
article examines the consequences of this decision.
Background to tile scheme
The Carrizo Valley is situated in the north of
Sinaloa State, N.W. Mexico between the large
irrigation scheme of the River Fuerte Valley and
the border of Sonora. Up to 30 June 1965, when
the government announced its intention of irriga-
ting the Valley by declaring it an Irrigation Dist-
rict, only 360 hectares were cultivated with tube-
well irrigation. Responsibility for the irrigation
project was vested in the River Fuerte Commis-
sion (CRF), a River Basin Authority responsible
ultimately to the Minister of Water Resources
but having wide-ranging delegated powers. The
land tenure pattern was extremely complex with
groups of ejidatarios and private owners laying
claim to the same land areas. Government figures
show 37.5 per cent of the land as belonging to
ejidatarios and 62.5 per cent controlled by 153
'smallholders'. Out of the conflicting claims and
activities by pressure groups and individuals, the
2 In the decade of the 1960s agricultural production increased
at an annual rate of 1.7 per cent compared with 5 per cent
per annum from 1930 to 1960 (See Ballesteros, 1974).
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Commission, in consultation with the Department
of Agrarian Affairs (now Minïstry of Agrarian
Reform), decided on a compromise solution
whereby all private owners were asked to surren-
der part of their property to the government in
return for provision of permanent irrigation sup-
plies on the remaining 30 hectares. It was then
proposed that the government land be allocated to
landless peasants who had gone through the legal
procedures for petitioning grants of ejido land.
In the plans, provisions were made for the
creation of 11 further ejidos in addition to the
eight created before 1965. These new ejidos would
have 2,600 members cultivating 26,000 hectares.
Eventually the ejido share ws increased to
27,669 hectares, leaving the private sector with
24 per cent of the irrigated land in the valley.
Two ejidos were to consist exclusively of
ejidatarios displaced by the construction of the
feeder reservoir.
The decision to create collective ejidos
It would appear from early studies (CRF, 1966),
that the planners (hydraulic engineers, agrono-
mists and economists) were thinking in terms of
a system of land exploitation based on individual
30
l050 hectare units. However, before the land was
put under the plough, the decision was taken to
work the ejido land collectively. This decision was
incorporated in the Presidential Agreement of
24 June 1970 which stated "As the works and
programmes carried out in the Irrigation District
of the Carrizo Valley have been financed by
funds from the Federal Government . . . the
optimum use of which is in the national interest,
it is imperative to proceed within the terms of
Article 200 of the Codigo Agrario, to collectively
organise ejido production. This will permit the
best use of the land and water, the purchase of
agricultural equipment, the purchase of agricul-
tural inputs at better prices, the collective sale
of products on better conditions, the correct ap-
plication of agricultural techniques and the re-
duction of production costs, all of which will
result in an improvement in the income of the
ejidatarios" (Diaro Oficial, 1970). The wording
of the decree suggests that the decision to collec-
tivise was influenced primarily by economic con-
siderations. It responded to the need to maintain
close control over the production process so as
to achieve optimum productivity levels and en-
sure the repayment of ail loans (50 per cent of
Ejiditarios working on a two hectare family subsistence plot, Carrizo Valley, Sinaloa, Mexico.
project capital came from the Banco Interameri-
cana De Desarrollo, 35.7 per cent from private
construction companies). lt was considered that
large units would offer economies of scale and
advantages in the administration of credit and
water.
it may be that the decision to favour collective
units was party influenced by the experience of
the CRF in the River Fuerte Irrigation Scheme
and elsewhere, where under a system of individual
ejido plots the renting out of plots to large land-
owners had increased rapidly in recent years. The
resultant concentration of control over the most
profitable land in Mexico in a few hands, and
the corresponding increase in social and economic
inequality were contributory factors to increasing
social tension, invasion of land by landless
peasants and the seizure of renter harvests by
ejidatarios. The planners hoped that by intro-
ducing collective agriculture in the Carrizo Valley
they could avoid the renting of ejido land and
subsequent loss of control, and at the same time
achieve the social objective of ensuring that the
benefits of harvests from the irrigated land would
accrue directly to the ejidatarios.
In conclusion, the adoption of this particular
policy was taken in the hope of creating efficient
capitalist enterprises and not, I suggest, in res-
ponse to a political ideology which favoured the
increase of collective control of the means of
production as part of a strategy directed at trans-
formation to a socialist society. In economic
terms the decision to adopt collective organisa-
tions appears a rational one, given the limited
experience of the vast majority of ejido members
in agricultural production under irrigation and
in the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, fer-
tilisers, insecticides and modern farm machinery.
Operation of collective ejidos
Whilst the CRF retained overall responsibility
for the control and operation of the irrigation
works and the efficient management of the
scheme, the major role in determining how the
collective ejidos were to be structured, managed
and controlled after the initiation of agricultural
activities in 1969 fell to two government credit
banks, the National Bank of Ejidal Credit
(BANJIDAL) and the National Agrarian Bank of
the North West (BANOSA)3. Operating under the
Agricultural Credit Law 1955 they were not per-
mitted to grant credit to an ejido as such, but
3 Elsewhere I compare the administrative structure and strategy
of the two banks (Winder, 1976) but in this paper I restrict
my attention to the operations of BANOSA, which in 1974-75
worked with 20 Local Agricultural Credit Societies with a
total membership of 1,280.
were obliged to constitute members of an ejido
into one or more local Ejido Credit Societies.
Members of these societies would then be jointly
responsible for the administration of credit and
the joint cultivation of their 10 hectare 'shares'
of ejido land.
The ejidatarios displaced by the reservoir con-
struction faced considerable difficulties in adjust-
ing to the new forms of organisation and pro-
duction. Most of their lives had been spent in-
dividually cultivating four or five hectare plots
with maize and ajonjoli under dry farming con-
ditions. In addition, each had an area of rough
grazing land, giving an average area per ejidatario
of 27 hectares. Some kept sheep, goats and beef
cattle, whilst others sold their pasture rights to
fellow ejidatarios. Many supplemented their low
incomes by cutting firewood for sale in nearby
urban centres. 38 per cent had experience of
irrigated agriculture but only as seasonal migrant
labourers to the coastal valleys of Sinaloa and
Sonora to work on the sugar cane, cotton and
tomato harvests. They came to the Carrizo Valley
expecting to be granted individual rights of
usufruct and to continue working their own plots
with family labour. When informed by CRF and
BANOSA that they had to organise themselves
collectively, otherwise no credit would be forth-
coming and they could stand to lose their rights
as ejidatarios, 81 of the 210 resettled ejidatarios
decided to form a collective credit society
(Society A) and start joint production imme-
diately. The remaining 129 opted to resist govern-
ment pressure and hold out for individual plots
but, after a further three months and with the next
agricultural cycle approaching, they too agreed to
form another credit society.
Society A suffered a net financial loss in each of
the first three agricultural seasons. Whilst many
factors contributed towards this initial economic
failure, the principal reason was the inability of
advisers and members to devise an efficient and
workable system of production control based on
mutual trust. Members had no previous experience
of collective cultivation and had never been in
receipt of government agricultural credit. Accord-
ing to the members, 'training' consisted of a num-
ber of talks to members in which technical staff
of BANOSA and CRF stressed the advantages
and benefits to be derived from collective work.
There is little evidence of attempts being made to
involve the members in devising an organisational
structure, or in discussing the logistics of plan-
ning, implementing and supervising the produc-
tion process and devising structures within which
all members were given clear duties and respon-
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sibilities. In part, this is perhaps due to the fact
that many of the technical staff were themselves
inexperienced in the management of production
co-operatives, and failed to see the importance of
carefully planned promotional work aimed at
increased collective consciousness. It also reflects
the universal reluctance of planners and techni-
cians to initiate a process of participation with
people whom they think know little about the
subject in hand and who inevitably will compli-
cate matters and create futher problems. As a
consequence, the Statutes (Acta Constitutiva) and
Regulations which prescribe the administrative
structure of each credit society, the requirements
for membership, rights and obligations of mem-
bers and officials, procedures for financial control
and management and the respective responsibili-
ties of members, society and bank, were prepared
by bank officials.
Wheat harvest on one of the collective units,
Carrizo Valley, Sinaloa, Mexico.
Organisational structure
The organisational structure laid down in the
Statute has much in common with cooperative
organisations in other countries. Ultimate auth-
ority lies with the General Assembly of all mem-
bers in which each has one vote. An elected Ad-
ministration Committee is headed by a member
delegate who administers the Society according
to the norms laid down in the Assembly and the
Administration Committee. The other principal
committee within the society is the vigilant or
watch committee, the Chairman of which acts as
internal financial inspector and work foreman.
Detailed examination of the procedures for credit
allocation and control, however, reveals the con-
straints which were placed on the members in
taking major policy decisions. First, each Society
was obliged to appoint "necessary administrative
and technical personnel, headed by a Director
of Production" (Acta Constitutiva, Sociedad Local
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de Credito Ejidal, BANOSA) who was to be
selected from amongst candidates submitted by
the Bank and paid out of Society profits. The
Regulations stipulated that the Director of Pro-
duction should "programme, direct and supervise
the production activities of the society to ensure
that they are carried out efficiently and oppor-
tunely and the best results obtained . .
.
; formu-
late and present to the General Assembly the
programme of work for the society at the start of
each agricultural season . .
. ; direct and supervise
the technical and administrative personnel" (Re g-
lamento Interno, Sociedad Local de Credito
Ejidal. BANOSA). Each credit application was
examined in detail by the Technical Cooperation
Department of BANOSA who carried out field
inspections to satisfy themselves that the proposed
cropping pattern was the most appropriate (i.e.
most likely to give a high rate of return on in-
vestment with minimum risk). They only con-
sidered requests for crops with a government
guaranteed price and no credit was to be given
for subsistence crops. As a further protection
for their investment, BANOSA are obliged by
law to ensure that all credit societies take out a
credit insurance policy with the National Agri-
cultural and Livestock Insurance Corporation
(ANAGSA). This means that BANOSA have in
turn to submit themselves to the norms and pro-
grammes of ANAGSA. ANAGSA officials carry
out their own technical study before approving
the planting and lay down a detailed timetable of
operations to be followed for each crop. This
calendar of operations also in effect determines
the type of methods to be used. Only with a
heavy emphasis on mechanisation could the
agricultural operations be completed so as to
conform to the demands of BANOSA and
ANAGSA, and to enable two crops to be grown
in 12 months.
The credit agreement signed at the start of every
agricultural season stipulates how the credit is
to be allocated and grants the Bank the right to
indicate technical norms, acquire products, con-
tract services and carry out inspection at any time
to ensure the correct investment of the loan
funds. In brief, the body of statutes, regulations
and contract clauses introduced by the agency
responsible for setting up the new collective pro-
duction units conforms to the inevitable tendency
of a banking institution to think first and fore-
most in terms of mechanisms to ensure economic
viability of the production system and therefore
maximum loan recovery. A consequence of the
decision to judge success on the criterion of the
rate of loan repayment is a reluctance to take
risks such as the delegation of decisions to the
production unit. Looked at from the agencies'
point of view, the insistence on adequate external
supervision and credit control is logical given the
large amounts of capital involved in producing
one hectare of crops, the sophisticated technology
used, the unknown quality of society members'
organisational and agricultural skills, and the
pressure from government to show quick eco-
nomic success with what was considered a pilot
scheme in collective agriculture amongst settlers
in a new irrigation district.
Response of society members to collective
system
Given the close supervision and control of credit,
and direction of the production process, why did
Society A and many other societies incur financial
losses in the first agricultural seasons? Responses
from members of Society A suggest that the
failure of the collective system can be attributed
to the lack of involvement of members in
decision-making, and lack of information and
any clear guidance in how to run a collective
production unit and carry out highly technical
agricultural operations. The absence of commit-
ment to a form of organisation which had been
imposed on them resulted in low motivation, in-
creasing absenteeism and evasion of responsibil-
ity. The habit of 'clocking-in' to mark up a work
point and then disappearing became common-
place, and adversely affected the morale of those
who were genuinely making an effort. (Everyone
was paid a maximum agricultural labourer's wage
for a day's work). Correspondence conducted at
the time between the Director of Production
(significantly, always referred to by the Society
Members as 'the Inspector') and the Society
reveals the unsatisfactory nature of the relation-
ship between the two parties and indicated the
frustration felt by society officials at their ex-
clusion from a large part of the decision-making
process. Bank officials selected and purchased
the seeds, fertilisers and insecticides, hired all
the machinery needed (tractors, aeroplanes, com-
bine harvesters) and arranged for the sale of
grain. The role of the majority of members was
reduced to providing labour for irrigation, weed-
ing crops and cleaning field canals. For the
greater part of the year they were unpaid spec-
tators of the production process. Their alienation
was increased by their inability to understand
the complex accounts presented to them verbally
by the Society accountant. In response to the
failure of the collective system to produce any
profits for distribution to members in the first
18 months and with the prospect of further losses,
members met to discuss alternative forms of
organisation which would encourage greater res-
ponsibility, permit more effective supervision and
control of production and lessen dependence on
the Bank.
Progressive subdivision of collective units
BANOSA eventually agreed to allow the Society
to sub-divide into four sectors as from May,
1972. Since then each agricultural season has
seen a further unofficial sub-division of land
within each sector. My study suggests that this
sub-division of the collective unit has been a
major factor in explaining the improved economic
performance of the Society since 1972. (Other
factors include improved techniques, disease con-
trol, crop and seed selection.) The trend towards
smaller production units with a few members in-
volved in each facilitated better control and en-
couraged members to take a more direct interest
in all aspects of the agricultural cycle. By 1975,
65 per cent of members had taken responsibility
for the cultivation of individual 9.5 hectare plots
whilst the remainder worked in small groups,
composed of members originating from the same
ejido outside the Valley and in most cases, kin.
Under this semi-collective system, credit is still
negotiated for the society as a whole and the
regulations on collective responsibility for debts
still apply. However, as soon as the seed has
been sown the care of the crop becomes the
responsibility of the individual or group, and the
profits they receive are related to the production
of 'their' plot and not, as before, to the number
of days worked. Members therefore see a direct
correlation between careful and opportune water-
ing, spraying, weeding, etc., and improved cash
income at the end of the season. Tractors are
now contracted by groups and individuals who
control the quality of the work. Groups are, no
longer dependent on the Bank for choice of
fertilisers. An indication of this increasing in-
dependence is the hiring of private consultants
by some groups to carry out soil analysis and
survey irrigation contours. Another result of the
increasing interest of members in controlling
society expenditure and improving productivity
was the decision to send society representatives
to supervise the loading of fertilisers and pesti-
cides into aircraft for aerial spraying. Previously
it was not uncommon for pilots to spray the
crops with water or a very weak solution and
sell the chemical product on the black market.
The allocation of family subsistence plots
The majority of BANOSA societies have
followed a similar pattern to that described above
in response to pressure from members to gain
greater control in the management of their pro-
duction units and the allocation of resources.
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However, in seeking for greater independence
from official institutions, members of other
credit societies advanced further by discovering
that the 1971 Agrarian Reform Law permitted
members of collective ejidos to request a family
plot (Article 140 of A.R. Law 1971). This group of
credit societies was successful in gaining the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Affairs
for the setting aside of part of the collective unit
for individual exploitation in two hectare plots.
The CRF expressed strong reservations over the
creation of family plots, arguing that the irriga-
tion system had not been designed for cultiva-
tion in two hectare plots, and as a consequence
there would be problems of water seepage,
difficulties of access for machinery and adverse
effects on productivity. However, the societies
have overcome these problems by redesigning
the irrigation and drainage systems.
One of the most serious problems facing mem-
bers has been the lack of working capital for
their family plots. For some this was a result
of low profits from the collective unit and in
others an inability to save. BANOSA made it
clear that they were not able to provide credit
for subsistence crops on family plots. Again, each
society has devised different ways of overcoming
this problem. One society bought seeds, fertil-
iser and insecticides on behalf of members and
allowed them to cancel the debt at the end of
the agricultural season. In some cases, societies
gave personal loans to members to help in cover-
ing production costs. With few exceptions, these
family plots have been brought under cultivation
and have enabled individual members to absorb
some of the untapped labour potential within
the household unit and to satisfy an increasing
amount of family demand for subsistence crops.
Many society members expressed the opinion
that the two hectare individual plot is more pro-
ductive than the equivalent amount of collective
land because they devoted more care and atten-
tion to it. Whilst this has yet to be proved, the
fact that pressure continues for an increasing
amount of collective land to be farmed individu-
ally or in small groups suggests that the
ejidatarios consider this system to be economically
and socially more successful. By mid-1975, how-
ever, most societies had not applied to the
Agrarian Reform Ministry for permission to
allocate individual two hectare plots to members.
An explanation put forward by the Member
Delegate of one society was that his members pre-
ferred to wait until they could control individual
ten hectare plots.
Continuing dependency
Despite fragmentation of collective units into
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smaller units for production control purposes,
credit societies remain in a relatively weak posi-
tion within the regional economic and political
system. They are involved in a network of de-
pendency ties with external agents as a result of
their continuing debt relationship with the govern-
ment credit agency and the type of technology
they have been obliged to adopt. This dependency
relationship has limited manoeuvrability of the
societies and has meant that any increase in
productivity has generally been matched by an
equivalent or greater increase in production
costs.
Cooperation between credit societies
A review of the literature on earlier collective
ejidos and credit societies reveals the vital role
played by Unions of ejidos and credit societies in
strengthening the bargaining power and the
economic viability of the ejido sector vis-à-vis
other interest groups. In the case of the Yaqui
Valley, between 1937 and 1943, the credit
societies purchased tractors, lorries and combine
harvesters and the central union ran an agricul-
tural machinery depot, a machine parts and tyre
store, a petrol station and a bus company
(Hewitt, 1974).
An examination of planning documents related
to the Carrizo Project indicates that the need to
create an organisation above the level of the
credit society or ejido which would be run by
ejidatarios and service the needs of constituent
organisations, was not foreseen. It was envisaged
that the CNC (National Peasant Confederation)
through its regional organisation would represent
the political interests of the ejidatarios and that
the official banks would take all necessary steps
to ensure that the economic interests of society
members were protected.
BANOSA, aware of the potential benefits to be
gained from the creation of an organisation to
provide a range of services and inputs which
could not economically be provided by individual
societies, took the initiative in setting up a credit
society, AGRO VAC (Agro Industry of the
Carrizo Valley). In 1970 the Bank pursuaded most
BANOSA societies to become members of
AGROVAC by assuring them that they would
receive benefits in the form of services and pro-
ducts delivered efficiently, opportunely and at low
cost, and would participate in any profits. They
were not required to purchase any shares in the
society and their only obligation was to make
use of the goods and services provided by the
society.
An examination of the achievements of
AGRO VAC over five years shows that the
potential for growth was not realised. Whilst
the society satisfied most of the liquid fertiliser
demand from members through its liquid nitro-
gen fertiliser production plant and spraying ser-
vice, it failed to provide a range of services which
would have lessened the dependence of societies
on private companies (purchase of tractors, com-
bine harvesters, crop storage, processing and
transport, to mention just a few).
Members attribute the ineffectiveness of AGRO-
VAC to maladministration and misuse of
resources. However, I suggest that the root cause
was the lack of participation by ejidatarios in
the administration of the Society. Members say
they never saw it as their Society serving their
interests. For them, the clearest indication of this
was the imposition by the Bank of a General
Administrator and Accountant to administer the
Society and take major policy decisions.
More recently (1975) an attempt was made to
create a Union of Ejido Credit Societies in the
Valley under ejidatario management to promote
actively the collective interests of all society
members in the valley. The first move of this new
organisation was to petition government agencies
in Mexico City for financial assistance to establish
a regional consumer shop, construct warehouses
for the storage of harvests and seeds, an agri-
cultural machinery depot, flour mill and fertiliser
plant, and to authorise the member societies to
produce their own seed and purchase fertiliser
directly from the Government Fertiliser
Company (GUANOMEX). The experience of
AGROVAC suggests that the government
agencies approached for assistance in projects
involving significant capital investment, will wish
to maintain close control over the management of
these resources, and that major investment deci-
sions will still be made by non-peasants and will
tend to reflect the interests of other social,
economic and political sectors. There are, in
addition, a number of factors internal to the ejido
sector which will tend to impede the development
of increasingly autonomous systems of inter-
societal co-operation.
First, the process of increasing social and econ-
omic differentiation within societies has led to
the creation of a group of members who stand
to benefit from a continuation of the present
system. This group has purchased agricultural
machinery which is hired to the society (only
five societies have their own machinery), lorries
which are used to transport inputs and harvest.
and small retail shops and garages. Members of
this group often occupy positions of leadership
within their credit society. Second, whilst many
members are aware of some of the potential
benefits to be gained from inter-societal co-
operatives, they have also experienced the frustra-
tions and difficulties of attempting to create co-
operative organisations within their own ejidos
with inadequate help and guidance, and can
anticipate a range of problems. The conditions
which contributed to the disintegration of endos
and societies still prevail, and mean that members
concentrate their attention on extending their span
of individual control and protecting their own re-
sources. In the long term one can expect that
socio-economic differentiation within the ejido
sector will increase as a result of differing resource
allocation strategies, and that the society members
with entrepreneurial skills will diversify out of
farming into a range of non-agricultural economic
activities. Some of the ejidatarios will thus join
the group who can perhaps be considered the
principal beneficiaries of the irrigation scheme-
those who supply the societies with machinery,
transport services, and 'green revolution' inputs,
and who dispose of their crops.
Conclusion
The collective system of production introduced
in the Carrizo Valley Irrigation Scheme has ex-
perienced significant modification during the first
five years of operation. Members of credit
societies, whilst maintaining collective responsi-
bility for credit, have sub-divided their organisa-
tion into progressively smaller units thus enab-
ling more members to take certain decisions con-
cerning the management of production (e.g., when
to weed, water, spray and plough). As these
changes in internal organisation have not re-
duced government control over such vital aspects
as credit expenditure and repayment, choice of
crops and seeds, sale of harvest and control of
water, BANOSA have permitted them to take
place. As the majority of societies has failed to
generate any saving capacity with a view to
eventually financing their own programmes, this
control is likely to continue. The economic
advantages to the State of this control are
apparent; the payment of all charges to govern-
ment agencies is guaranteed, the government is
able to plan the agricultural production of the
ejido sector in terms of national needs and the
expensive hydraulic systems are well maintained.
Optimum productivity is far from being reached,
and the CRF are closely monitoring productivity
for each Credit Society in an attempt to identify
the reasons for low output and profits.
More could have been done to strengthen
the economic position of ejido members by the
creation of a Union of Credit Societies to pro-
vide the range of services and inputs now pro-
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vided by a wide range of intermediaries. How-
ever, once these entrepreneurs become established
and recruit members of credit societies into their
midst the likelihood of establishing an effective
Union of Credit Societies diminishes.
Finally, one is left questioning the wisdom of
opting for a highly mechanised system of exten-
sive agriculture in a situation where the major
resource of the ejidos was manpower. If the rates
of rural employment and unemployment are not
to increase even further4 then more priority needs
to be given to the creation of a wide range of
employment opportunities on schemes such as the
Carrizo Valley. By diversification into areas such
as vegetable, fruit, poultry, pig and milk produc-
tion and the construction of related agro-
industries including a flour mill and a plant for
soya products, full productive employment could
have been provided not only for the Carrizo
Valley ejidatarios but also for their sons and
daughters. CRF and BANOSA, however, opted
for the low risk approach, and confined their
attention to a limited range of cash crops
(principally wheat/soya rotation) using the
capital-intensive green revolution technology
package. The credit societies never had the
unified purpose or will which would have enabled
them to press for an alternative strategy based
on maximum self-sufficiency of the ejido sector.
4 It is estimated that 30 per cent of manpower in the agricul-
tural sector has productive employment throughout almost the
whole year, 60 per cent work only from one to five months a
year and the remaining 10 per cent have no productive em-
employment (Ballesteros, 1974).
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Instead, they concentrated on taking steps to
identify a particular plot of land to which they
might some day have a title of tenure guarantee.
At the same time, they struggled to reach a full
understanding of the technical and financial com-
plexities of the most advanced agricultural pro-
duction systems in Mexico.
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